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Abstract 
Detailed economic analyses of fisher performance are critical inputs in improving the management of fisheries. The paper 
provides guidelines about the economic methodologies and the data required to monitor and assess the performance of 
individual transferable quota fisheries. In particular, it describes the methods of evaluation that could be applied to examine 
profitability, competitiveness, efficiency, equity, productivity, output and input interactions, capacity and sustainability of 
such fisheries.  
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Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) represent a 
property-rights approach to addressing the externalities 
inherent in the exploitation of common-pool resources.  
Since their first use in commercial fisheries in the 1970s, 
ITQs have been implemented in many different countries 
and environments including the US, Canada, Australia, 
Iceland, New Zealand and the Netherlands.  In recent 
years, different authors have provided assessments of 
ITQs from various perspectives1 and several workshops 
and conferences have been influential in showing the 
advantages and potential weaknesses associated with 
ITQs2.  These studies, and the lessons learnt by fishery 
managers when implementing ITQs, have proved useful 
in improving management practices. Despite these 
assessments, many gaps exist in terms of our 
understanding of the economic effects of ITQs. For 
example, although the often stated goal of introducing 
ITQs is to improve economic efficiency, very few studies 
exist which test for changes in efficiency following the 
introduction of rights-based fisheries management. 
To assist researchers and managers improve the 
management of ITQs, this paper provides guidelines 
about the economic methodologies and the data required 
to monitor and assess the performance of fisheries, and to 
identify and quantify the economic benefits that can be 
directly attributed to the adoption of an ITQ management 
program. Section II provides a guide to some of the 
approaches to measure the on-going economic 
performance of fishers, section III discusses the data 
requirements for economic performance measures and 
section IV concludes. 
 
II. Economic Methodologies for Monitoring Fisheries 
 
Fishery managers are likely to be concerned about a 
number of economic measures including profitability, 
competitiveness, management quality and costs, 
efficiency, equity, productivity, output and input 
interactions, capacity and sustainability. Switching from a 
 2 
command and control (CAC) management program to a 
property rights-based program such as ITQs can impact 
many if not all of these measures.  
 Understanding and quantifying how management 
reform affects economic measures of performance 
provides important feedback for managers and resource 
users that can be used to assess the performance of the 
new management program and, if necessary, provide 
guidance for program design modifications. A review of 
some of the potential methods, and their data 
requirements, that could be employed to monitor 





A central question of fishery managers, and often a 
principal reason for introducing ITQs, is to increase the 
net returns of fishers. Net returns may increase due to a 
number of factors including, rises in output prices due to 
increased quality of fish, or change in product form, 
reductions in operating costs per unit of harvest due to 
reductions in congestion externalities, the relaxation of 
input restrictions, and quota transfers that enable low cost 
fishers to expand their operations and take advantage of 
economies of scale and scope, and adjustments, over time, 
to optimal levels of the fixed factors used by fishers. 
       Several methods exist to estimate profitability of 
fishers. The preferred approach is to collect reliable costs 
and earnings data from the population, or a random 
sample of the population, and measure directly changes in 
net returns over time, accounting for the resource rent 
redistribution in the fishery. Such data can also be used to 
estimate profit and cost functions to derive measures of 
substitutability between inputs and between outputs and 
capacity utilization. In addition, mathematical 
programming approaches may also be used to assess 
resource rents in ITQ fisheries that can be used to 
examine the potential impacts of introducing quota 
programs3. 
Where reliable costs and earnings data are not 
available, quota price data (lease and sale prices) may be 
used to provide a measure of expected net returns in an 
ITQ fishery that exceed the normal return to the factors 
used to produce fish. Deriving measures of profitability 
from lease and sale prices of quota is, however, 
problematic as prices can exhibit considerable variation 
across time, and across trades for a given point in time4. 
Further, various factors including uncertainty, imperfect 
information, limitations on transferability divisibility and 
duration of the property and market power may distort 
prices such that they do not necessarily reflect the 
marginal value of additional unit of harvest from the 
resource. Finally, ITQ rental prices alone do not reflect 
changes
 in economic profitability that are attributable to 
management reform. In addition, comprehensive analysis 
of changes in profitability must consider the role of 
management operating rules on the redistribution of 
resource rents, as well as changes in the returns to 
individual fisher capital and labor endowments. 
In the absence of reliable costs and earnings data, 
other data may also be used to assess changes in 
profitability. For example, if data are available on 
aggregate landings, consumption and output prices, it may 
be possible to estimate changes in prices due to the 
increased length of the fishing season as a result of 
introducing ITQs5. Further, log-book data may provide 
information on the number of fishing days and which is 
likely to be inversely related to congestion externalities in 
the fishery. Similarly, data on the number of crew 
employed and the number of vessels in the fishery may 
also provide crude measures of the level of variable and 




An important concern for fishers is that if their 
competitors and fish processors achieve a degree of 
market power, it may reduce the price they receive for 
their fish or the quota they may wish to sell6.  This issue is 
of interest to fishery managers because market power may 
distort efficiency, benefit one group of fishers at the 
expense of others and, if the market power is exercised in 
a collusory manner, may be illegal. To help address the 
concerns of fishers, many ITQ programs specify limits on 
the amount of quota that can be owned by any one 
company or individual. Unfortunately, restrictions on the 
property right may constrain low cost fishers, who do not 
exercise market power, from acquiring as greater a share 
of the quota holdings as they would like7. 
Fishery managers can employ various means to 
assess the competitiveness of the quota market and the 
market for fish. The easiest measures to implement are 
concentration ratios that provide an index of market share 
of firms. The so-called Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) is a commonly used measure in various industries 
and is defined by equation (4). 





   (4) 
where Si is the market share of firm i and, if only one firm 
exists in the market, the index has a value of unity8.  The 
problem with a concentration ratio is that the existence of 
a relatively small number of firm in the market does not, 
by itself, imply market power. 
An alternative to measuring firm shares is to 
monitor the prices and trades of quota and fish. If the 
domestic price of fish, for example, is not responsive to 
increases, but is highly sensitive to decreases in the export 
price, it provides some evidence of the exercise of market 
power by fish processors. Conversely, if quota prices 
(especially lease prices) do not appear to increase with 
rises in the landed price of fish, but fall with declines in 
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output prices, it provides some evidence of market power 
in the quota market.   
              An important question to address is, what should 
be done in response to evidence of market power? The 
answer will depend on many factors including the 
jurisdiction of where the fishery is located. Whatever the 
approach used to make markets more competitive, 
regulators should be aware that sometimes the remedy, 
such as restrictions on the property right, may be worse 
than the problem itself.  
 
C. Management Costs and Quality 
 
Economic monitoring of fisheries requires that an 
estimate of the costs associated with fisheries 
management be obtained. Some management activities 
that are required under CAC will be replaced with new, 
and possibly more costly, management activities under 
ITQs. For instance, in a CAC fishery managers may 
regulate the gear used, the season length, the location of 
fishing, as well as vessel numbers and their size.  
              Fewer adjustments may be required under ITQs, 
however, introducing ITQs and ensuring that they 
represent an exclusive and durable property right often 
involves extra management costs in terms of monitoring 
and enforcement. Although some management costs may 
rise with ITQs, other expenses may decline, such as the 
transactions costs associated with regulating inputs of 
fishers. Moreover, a switch to ITQs may be associated 
with changes in management responsibilities and, in some 
cases, the costs of some activities (such as monitoring and 
enforcement) may be transferred from the regulator to the 
fishers themselves. 
To ensure the net benefits associated with ITQs 
include all costs, the extra expenses in managing ITQs 
should be calculated. In some ITQ fisheries, the 
management costs are borne by the fisheries regulator and 
apportioning costs across fisheries can be problematic. 
Although fixed costs can be difficult to apportion, the 
extra costs associated with monitoring landings and quota 
holdings should be identified.  In some cases, these costs 
are fully-funded by the fishers themselves and the 
expenses are easily obtainable. Whatever the cost sharing 
arrangement, the expenses associated with fisheries 
management should be regularly recorded. 
In addition to ensuring that the extra costs 
associated with ITQs are accounted for, some effort 
should be made to assess changes in the quality of 
management. For example, a shift to ITQs has encouraged 
some fishers to improve the quality of stock assessment 
and this has been accompanied with higher management 
costs.  Measuring changes in quality is a difficult 
undertaking but annual surveys of management 
performance, as perceived by fishers, would provide an 
index over time of the perceived quality of management, 
as would regular audits of management performance.         
 
D.  Efficiency 
 
An often-stated attribute of ITQs is that they improve 
economic efficiency. Despite the goal, measures of 
efficiency are probably the least understood and are rarely 
undertaken in fisheries. The term efficiency has been 
interpreted in a number of ways in fisheries. A precise 
definition describes technical inefficiency as the 
overutilization of all inputs, allocative inefficiency as the 
utilization of inputs in wrong proportions relative to factor 
prices, and scale inefficiency as production at an 
inappropriate level of output. Economic inefficiency may 
arise from technical, allocative or scale inefficiency, or 
any combination thereof 9. Further details of the different 
measures of efficiency, including individual factor 
measures of technical and allocative efficiency, are 
provided in Grafton Squires and Fox (1999). 
Various methods exist for deriving individual 
efficiency measures. Two of the principal approaches 
include a form a mathematical programming called Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and econometric approach 
that estimates a stochastic frontier. In both cases, the 
production, cost or profit frontier of firms is unknown and 
is estimated using data from a sample of fishers.  
 
Data Envelopment Analysis Methodology 
 
The data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach is non-
parametric and does not impose a functional form on the 
specification of the frontier but, unlike the stochastic 
frontier, supposes that deviations from the frontier are due 
to inefficiencies alone. The methodology uses cross-
sectional or panel data to construct a piece-wise frontier 
and can be used where there exist multiple outputs and 
inputs.10   
To illustrate the approach, a ratio of all outputs over 
all inputs for a given observation i can be defined and 
weights assigned for each output and input, i.e., 
 
u
Tyi / vTxi 
 
where (uT,  vT) is the output-input weights for observation 
i. The mathematical programming model requires that the 
weights of u and v are maximized, given the constraint 
that the weights are nonnegative and that efficiency 
measures for all observations are equal to or less than one, 
where an efficiency measure of unity is at the frontier. If 
the inputs weights are normalized such that vTxi = 1, the 
mathematical program is called the “multiplier” problem 
and output and input weights are chosen to solve (5). 
 
 Maximize uTyi     
 








xi = 1, 
 
u, v   
 
In practice, the dual to the problem (5) is solved because 
it involves fewer constraints and is called the 
“envelopment” problem. The problem is solved N times 
DQG D VFDODU  LV FDOFXODWHG IRU HDFK REVHUYDWLRQ ZKHUH i 
= 1 implies that firm i is technically efficient and on the 
frontier.  
 The DEA approach is relatively easy to apply 
provided there exists individual fisher data on outputs and 
inputs. Moreover, it can be extended to include variable 
returns to scale and, if price data is available, individual 
measures of allocative efficiency may also be derived. For 
example, if costs and earnings data are available, 
managers can calculate allocative and technical 
efficiencies under the assumption of cost minimization for 
a given level of landings. Calculations of these efficiency 
measures are relatively straightforward if one of the 
several packages especially designed for this purpose are 
used11.  
 
Stochastic Frontier Methodology 
 
An alternative to the DEA approach to deriving efficiency 
measures is to estimate a stochastic frontier using 
regression techniques. Unlike DEA, the stochastic frontier 
does not presume that deviations from the frontier are due 
exclusively to inefficiencies and, instead, assumes that 
deviations can be caused by stochastic events (such as bad 
weather, luck, etc.), as well as inefficiency, at the vessel 
level. By contrast to the DEA, the stochastic frontier 
approach requires the specification of a functional form 
and is limited to those situations where there is a single 
dependent variable.  
 The stochastic frontier can be defined with 
output, revenue, cost or profit as the dependent variable, 
depending on the data available and what measure is 
desired. If we define yi as the dependent variable, xi as a 
vector of inputs, the stochastic frontier is defined by (6). 
 
 yi = f(xiH[S0i - i) , i = 1, 2, …, N    (6) 
 
ZKHUH  LV D YHFWRU RI SDUDPHWHUV WR EH HVWLPDWHG 0i is a 
UDQGRP GLVWXUEDQFH WHUP DVVXPHG WR EH 11
2
0), and 
which accounts for random shocks to the production 
prRFHVV EH\RQG WKH FRQWURO RI ILVKHUV DQG i is assumed to 
EH LQGHSHQGHQW RI 0i and a non-negative random variable 
associated with technical inefficiency12. In the case of a 
fishery, the frontier should also include a technological 
constraint that reflects changes in the resource stock that, 
in turn, influences the output, returns and costs of fishers. 
 7KH i term is commonly assumed to be 
distributed as a exponential, half normal, truncated 
normal or a two parameter gamma and the frontier is 
usually estimated using maximum likelihood. A measure 
of technical efficiency, as shown in (7), for each 
observation (TEi) is  defined as the ratio of observed to 
maximum feasible yi  where yi  is observed output, 
 
 TEi  =  yi / f(xiH[S0i)  =  exp(- i)    (7) 
 
The UDQGRP GLVWXUEDQFH 0i can be eliminated from 
efficiency measures by subtracting it from observed 
output such that yi - 0i  =  Ôi - i where Ôi  is predicted 
output and, by definition, yi - Ôi  0i - i VXFK WKDW 0i  =  
yi - Ôi   i13. In this approach, the focus is on the 
estimation of TEi DQG WKH SDUDPHWHU HVWLPDWHV RI  DUH RI D
lesser interest, as are estimates of elasticities of 
substitution derived from the frontier15. 
 Most of the functional forms used in estimating a 
stochastic frontier are linear in logarithms in the 
dependent variable and inputs. Where input price data are 
available, the stochastic frontier approach can also be 
used to derive a measure of economic efficiency by 
estimating a cost frontier (or production frontier) self-dual 
to a production function (or cost function). Measures of 
economic efficiency may be obtained from i in the cost 
IURQWLHU DQG PHDVXUHV RI WHFKQLFDO HIILFLHQF\ XVLQJ i 
from the production frontier. Measures of allocative 
efficiency can then derived by noting that allocative 
efficiency is the ratio of economic efficiency over 
technical efficiency. 
 
Assessing Changes in Efficiency 
 
Measuring changes in efficiency that are attributable to 
management reform raises a number of challenges. In 
particular we would expect that ITQs will affect the 
location of firms relative to the production set, as well 
change its shape and location. For example, relaxing gear 
restrictions under ITQ management should enhance 
individual firm efficiency, which implies that firms will 
be located closer to the frontier of the producible set.  
 Both the DEA and stochastic frontier 
methodologies can be used to measure ex-post changes in 
efficiency due to variables outside of the short-term 
control of fishers, such as the effects of relaxing 
management constraints, or changes in the size of a 
vessel. One approach to assessing changes in efficiency is 
to regress the estimated individual efficiency measures 
against so-called environmental variables that can be 
either categorical or continuous.   
 This two-stage approach requires that Tobit 
regressions be estimated to account for the censoring of 
the technical, allocative, and economic efficiency 
measures at zero and one.  Effects of a shift in the 
management regime, such as the introduction of ITQs, 
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can be evaluated with dummy variables for the year the 
regime changed provided that data is available from 
before and after the change took place.  The effects of the 
regime shift can be evaluated by Wald tests of the null 
hypothesis of no change in efficiency between two time 
periods. For example, using two dummy variables, Dbefore 
ITQs  - Dafter ITQs  =  0, tests the null hypothesis of equal 
efficiency for vessels before and after ITQs were 
introduced into the fishery.  If the chi-square value is 
significant for an efficiency measure (given a single linear 
restriction and hence one degree of freedom), the null 




Equity issues of concern to fishers include how ITQs are 
initially allocated, the consequences of quota trades on the 
market structure in the fishery, and the effects of ITQs on 
returns to labor and among quota holders. Equity is 
important because fishery managers often place 
considerable importance upon the distribution of income 
and wealth among fishers, and because it may affect both 
the sustainability of the resource and efficiency of the 
fleet. For instance, given that enforcement is costly, a 
group of fishers who feel the initial allocation of ITQs 
was unfair may be able to disrupt or subvert the 
harvesting rules necessary to ensure the proper 
management of the fishery. Moreover, given uncertainty 
over the state of the fishery and future quota prices, the 
initial allocation may affect the equilibrium quota-trading 
outcome16.  
The equity issue is of greatest concern when 
assigning the initial allocation of quota. The common 
practice has been to base initial allocations on the past 
harvests and/or characteristics of vessels and thus assign 
the rights to vessel owners. Alternative arrangements 
could also include allocations to crew or communities or 
the auctioning of the rights. After ITQs have been 
introduced, equity concerns can be addressed in a number 
of ways including the capture of rent from quota holders 
with a portion assigned to persons deemed to have been 
losers in the new management regime17.  
An important concern in fisheries is the income 
distribution among fishers. Income inequality measures 
should, in principle, satisfy the criteria of anonymity (it 
should not matter who earns the income), population (the 
size of the population should not affect inequality), 
scaling/relativity (only the relative income of individuals 
should matter) and the Dalton principle (when comparing 
two different income distributions, if one can be derived 
from the other by a series of regressive transfers then it is 
less equal than the other)18. Where costs and earnings data 
for vessels and remuneration data of the skipper and crew 
exist, a useful measure of inequality can be derived from 
the Lorenz curve which plots the relationship between 
cumulative income or wealth or quota holdings (on the 
vertical axis) against the cumulative population of fishers 
or quota-holders (on the horizontal axis).  If every person 
has the same income or wealth, the curve is represented 
by a 450 line, and the more unequal the distribution the 
greater area between the Lorenz curve and the 450 line. 
When comparing different income distributions, provided 
the Lorenz curves do not cross, this approach satisfies the 
four criteria of inequality measures. 
Quantitative measures of inequality can also be 
obtained from the Lorenz curve. For instance, the Gini 
coefficient measures the area between the Lorenz curve 
and the 450 line relative to the entire area below the 450 
line, where a measure of 0 indicates that all individuals 
have identical incomes. Another measure of inequality 
that requires data by individual is the coefficient of 
variation, defined as the standard deviation of income of 
the population divided by the mean income. If detailed 
income or wealth data is only available by groups (such as 
vessel owners or crew members) an alternative measure 
of inequality is to estimate Kuznets ratios where the ratio 
of income earned by crew can be compared to income 




Productivity measures provide a useful tool for evaluating 
economic and other changes in fisheries. Measures of 
productivity are usually defined as the total output or 
harvest as a ratio to the most important input. For 
example, labor productivity in a fishery could be defined 
as total landings of fish per crew-member, or vessel 
productivity could be defined as total harvest per vessel. 
Different productivity measures, however, need not move 
in the same direction such that labor productivity may be 
declining contemporaneously with an increase in vessel 
productivity.   
An alternative and broader measure is TFP 
which is simply the ratio of the ratio of output(s) to all 
inputs at a point in time t, i.e., 
 
 TFPt = Output Index t / Input Index t    (8) 
 
where the output and input indices may be formed from 
data for one vessel over time, from many vessels for a 
point in time or from many vessels over time. The choice 
of the index for the outputs and inputs has been subject of 
much research19. A useful index with theoretically 
desirable properties is the Fisher Ideal Index (FII) and is 
defined as the geometric mean of the Paasche and 
Laspeyeres indices, i.e., 
 
 FII  =  LP u       (9) 
 
where the Paasche price index (P) uses base period 
quantities as weights and the Laspeyeres price index (L) 
uses current period quantities as weights. In the case 
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where multilateral comparisons are required (across 
vessels) the FII, or any other index, should be made 
transitive using an approach called the EKC method20.   
 Changes in TFP over time can be calculated by 
defining the ratio of TFP over time21, 
 
 TFPt+1 / TFPt = (Output Index t+1 / Output Index
 
t)/ (Input 
Index t+1 / Input Index
 
t)     (10). 
 
The index of the growth in TFP can be defined as a 
residual, in a discrete form, between the rate of growth of 
real product and the rate of growth of real factor input as 
per equation (11), 
 





t  - 




t             (11). 
 
The approach defined by (11), in a continuous form, is a 
so-called growth accounting approach to measuring 
changes in TFP over time. The approach, when applied to 
fisheries, must also explicitly account for the resource 
stock that should be treated as a technological constraint 
in the production process of firms22. 
A fundamental problem of productivity is how to 
interpret changes over time. In other words, are 
productivity increases due to technical change? Or, are 
they due to changes in efficiency? Or changes in the 
resource stock? An approach that tries to decompose 
productivity changes is the Malmqvist productivity index 
(MPI). The MPI measures TFP as the ratio of the distance 
to a production frontier, for each observation, under a 
common technology. The distance measure may be 
defined as an output distance function on the output set 
P(x) for the input vector x = (x1,  x2, …,  xn ) and output 
vector y = (y1,  y2, …,  yn ), as per equation (12), 
 
 D0(x, y  PLQ ^ y / <x)}   (12) 
 
where the distance function D0(x, y) has the value of unity 
if the observation is on the frontier23.  
 The MPI can be constructed using distance 
functions. In the two period case, the index is defined by 
equation (13), 
 
 M0 (yt+1, xt+1, yt, xt) = [D0t(xt+1,yt+1)/ D0t(xt,yt)  X 
D0t+1(xt+1,yt+1)/ D0t+1(xt,yt)]1/2   (13) 
 
where D0t(xt+1,yt+1) represents the distance of the 
observation in period t+1 to the best practice defined by 
period t  and D0t+1(xt+1,yt+1) represents the distance of the 
observation in period t+1 to the best practice defined by 
period t+1. 
The MPI can be equivalently written as equation (14), 
 
 M0 (yt+1, xt+1, yt, xt) = E [D0t(xt+1,yt+1)/ D0t+1(xt+1,yt+1)  X 
D0t(xt,yt)/ D0t+1(xt,yt)]1/2      (14) 
 
where E = D0t+1(xt+1,yt+1)/ D0t(xt,yt) and is the change in 
technical efficiency between period t and t+1 defined as 
the ratio of the technical efficiency of the observation at 
t+1, relative to the best practice frontier at t+1, to the 
technical efficiency of the observation in period t, relative 
to the best practice frontier in period t.  In equation (14), 
the MPI consists of a measure of efficiency change 
defined by E and a measure of technical change defined 
by a geometric mean in the shift in the technology, or best 
practice frontier over time. An overall improvement 
(decline) in technical efficiency, technical change and 
productivity over time is represented by an increase 
(decrease) in E, the square root of the second term in (14) 
and the MPI.  
 The MPI can be calculated in fisheries provided 
there exists individual data on inputs and outputs. 
Specialist software packages are available if a DEA 
methodology is used24. Alternatively, a stochastic 
production frontier may be estimated that includes a time 
trend to capture technical change in the frontier, and 
parameters to estimate, that explain how technical 
efficiency varies over time.  Both approaches, however, 
require multiple observations in each time period to 
construct a frontier and that requires data that is 
frequently unavailable in fisheries. Where such data is 
lacking, an index of TFP may be derived from as few as 
two observations (one vessel over two time periods) 
provided that both price and quantity data is available to 
aggregate inputs and outputs (using a FII or some other 
index). In this approach, a frontier or best practice 
technology is not estimated and, instead, a measure of 
productivity change is defined as a ratio of an output and 
input index. The deficiency of this more straightforward 
approach is that it does not decompose productivity 
changes into changes due to technical efficiency and 
technical change.  
 
G. Multi-Product and Multi-Input Issues 
 
Increasingly, ITQs are being applied to multi-species 
fisheries and the issues of substitutability among species 
and the nature of the harvesting technology are important 
to ensuring effective management25.  For example, 
introducing ITQs on a subset of species requires an 
understanding of the possible substitution between ITQ 
and non-ITQ species, and the extent to which harvesting 
processes are distinct or joint among different species. 
 To better understand the nature of the harvesting 
process in multi-species fisheries, cost, revenue and profit 
functions may be estimated26. Under certain regularity 
conditions, the production frontier of vessels may be 
constructed from the dual (cost, revenue and profit) 
functions and the output supplies and input demands can 
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be derived using the Envelope Theorem. Thus the dual 
functions provide a means of estimating the 
complementarity or substitutability among several outputs 
and inputs. Moreover the dual functions, and the 
corresponding input demand and output supply functions, 
can be used to derive price elasticities and thus obtain a 
measure of the responsiveness of the fleet to changes in 
prices. 
 The choice of which dual function to estimate 
depends on data availability and the nature of the fishery. 
For instance, a cost function requires the assumption that 
the outputs of fishers are constrained in some way. Where 
costs are unavailable, but price and output data exist, a 
revenue function may be estimated to derive output 
supply functions. If cost, price and output data is available 
a profit function, or a restricted profit function where one 
or more inputs are fixed, may be estimated. Another 
important issue is the choice of the functional form of the 
dual function to be estimated. Wherever possible, 
functional forms should be fully flexible such that they do 
not constrain the values of the elasticities derived from 
the input demands or output supplies27.   
 A functional form that has been applied in multi-
species fisheries and which is often less demanding in 
terms of data requirements than estimating cost or profit 
functions, is the generalized Leontief revenue function 
defined by (15), 
 




ij (Pi Pj)1/2 Z +  ¦
i
i Pi Z2  
      (15) 
 
where  Pi is the price of species i and Z is a composite 
input28.  Using Hotelling’s Lemma the input-compensated 
supply function may be derived and hypotheses tested, 
such as whether the harvesting function is non-joint in 
inputs or separable in inputs and outputs.  
 If data is unavailable on an individual fisher 
basis, measures of inputs and outputs29 can be constructed 
using aggregate data over time. Thus, for example, a large 
increase in landings in a non-ITQ species, following the 
introduction of ITQs in a multi-species fishery, indicates 






Capacity may be defined as the ability of a firm, in the 
short-run, to produce the maximum level of output 
without any restrictions to the amount of variable inputs 
that can be used. Capacity in fisheries has been defined as 
the maximum level of landings or output that can be 
achieved in a given period of time if the fishing fleet is 
fully utilized, and given the current state of technology 
and the resource stock. 
In the fisheries literature, capacity is often 
related to one measure of the inputs used by fishers, 
usually the gross registered tonnage or the number of 
vessels in a fishing fleet. Programs designed to reduce 
overcapacity have focused on reductions in capital stock 
measures. In reality, fishers use a variety of fixed and 
semi-fixed inputs and a mix of variable inputs that may be 
used in varying proportions with the fixed inputs. 
Moreover, in many fisheries, a range of outputs are 
produced each of which may be derived from their own 
unique resource stocks. Thus, measures of capital 
utilization and capacity utilization will not, in general, 
coincide in fisheries and any measure of capacity must be 
defined in terms of sustainable levels of the resource 
stocks.  
 The DEA methodology can be used to calculate 
capacity output, given the variable factors are unbounded, 
and the fixed factors, resource stock and technology 
constrain output31.  A drawback of the DEA approach is 
that it assumes deviations from the frontier arise from 
inefficiency and not stochastic or random events. 
However, DEA does not impose an underlying functional 
form (as is the case with econometric or parametric 
methods), is relatively easy to apply, only requires data on 
inputs and outputs and can provide a measure of capacity 
output for each species, as well as overall measures of 
fleet capacity32.  
An alternative to the DEA methodology is to 
assume that firms maximize profit and to estimate a 
restricted profit function. In this econometric approach, 
measures of capacity utilization can be derived which 
define the output gap that exists when actual output 
differs from capacity output (or alternatively the cost gap 
in a dual problem). In this approach, measures of capacity 
utilization provide an indication as to whether the current 
level of the fixed factor is in long-run equilibrium33.  
Where individual data on outputs and inputs are 
unavailable, alternative measures may be derived. An 
easy-to-compute measure is fleet hold capacity that 
requires data on the number of vessels, their hold capacity 
(or some other measure of capital, such as vessel length) 
and the number of full hold trips per fishing season. Using 
this data, a maximum potential fleet hold capacity in tons 
of fish can be derived. The ratio of the total allowable 
catch (TAC) to maximum potential provides a measure, 
albeit of limited value, of aggregate capital (or more 
precisely hold) utilization and provides an indication of 
the potential to increase the total harvest in the absence of 
major vessel expenditures.  
A slightly more sophisticated approach involves 
estimating a maximum potential output using time series 
data from a fishery, where the potential output less actual 
output is interpreted as a measure of excess capacity. 
Alternatively, a composite input in the harvesting process, 
such as gross registered tonnage (GRT) may be multiplied 
by a measure of technological efficiency.  Aggregate 
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measures for a fleet may then be obtained by multiplying 
different vessel types by their average GRT, and 
technology efficiency, to derive a measure of capacity 




A major concern of fishery managers is the potential for 
ITQs to encourage harvesting practices that may be 
deleterious to the sustainability of the fishery35.  Quota 
busting, or the illegal landing of fish in excess of quota-
holdings, is a particular concern and requires an adequate 
system of monitoring of landings. The monitoring may 
include visual inspection, or the weighing of landings at 
specified ports, and the auditing of fish deliveries to fish 
processors and the reconciliation of quota-holdings and 
overall landings. Although quota busting has, at one time 
or another, existed in most ITQ fisheries, managers and 
the fishers themselves have developed effective systems 
to monitor landings and reconcile harvest with quota 
shares. 
 A much more difficult problem to assess is the 
potential of fishers to “highgrade” where smaller or less 
desirable fish are thrown overboard so that the revenue 
per unit of quota is maximized36. Further, fishers who 
may not wish to land certain fish, or have difficulty 
reconciling their catches to existing quota holdings, may 
chose to dump fish at sea.  The dumping or discarding of 
fish in turn may compromise the sustainability of the 
resource, especially if the discards are not estimated in 
overall fishing mortalities.  
The most effective (and most expensive way) to 
prevent discarding is to have on-board inspectors. Such an 
approach has been highly successful in large offshore ITQ 
fisheries where returns are sufficient to cover the costs of 
an on-board observer. In many ITQ fisheries, however, 
this solution is not financially viable and alternative 
measures are required. For example, if discarding is 
perceived to be a problem, observers may be placed on a 
small number of vessels during the season and the mix of 
species and characteristics from the harvest of such 
vessels may be compared to vessels without inspectors. 
Hypothesis tests can then be applied to evaluate whether 
the harvest characteristics of the vessels, with and without 
observers, come from the same distribution. 
A more technical approach to the potential 
discarding problem involves the use of video cameras and 
recorders fitted to vessels for visual inspection of a 
vessel’s harvest, and subsequent comparison to the fish 
landed on shore. Whatever the approach, an on-going 
system of monitoring and evaluation is required to ensure 
that harvesting practices do not compromise the 
sustainability of the fishery. 
 
III. Data Requirements 
 
The ideal source of economic data on fisheries is a 
comprehensive time series of individual vessel data of the 
entire fisher population that includes prices and quantities 
of all inputs and outputs per fishing season. 
Unfortunately, such data does not exist for any ITQ 
fishery and, at best, researchers and managers have access 
to costs and earnings data of a sample of vessels at 
different points in time. At worst, the only data available 
may be aggregate information on landings and the number 
of vessels---information that provides little opportunity 
for in-depth and meaningful economic analysis. 
   If ITQ fisheries are to be managed effectively, 
data on individual fishers over time are required. The 
economic data collection, and its evaluation, should be an 
integral part of fisheries management. Compared to the 
costs of monitoring and enforcement, the expenses 
associated with collecting and evaluating such data from a 
sample of fishers are relatively small. The data collected 
should include individual vessel data with details on the 
skipper and crew characteristics, ownership, vessel and 
gear characteristics, fishing and non-fishing income, gear 
and maintenance costs, debt, licence and quota costs, and 
revenue, cost break-downs and input use (if possible) by 
species. Confidentiality of the data must be ensured, but 
the unit of analysis must be kept at the firm level to fully 
evaluate the economic performance of fishers.  
 In ITQ fisheries, records are also maintained on 
quota holdings and permanent trades and, sometimes, 
price data on quota traded that provide insights into the 
characteristics of quota owners and vessels that may be 
expanding their operations or exiting the fishery. Such 
data, coupled with log-book information, may also be 
used to track economic performance of individual fishers 
and the fleet. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
Increasingly, regulators are using individual transferable 
quotas to address the common-pool problems inherent in 
fisheries. Despite their increasing use, very few studies 
exist that track the changes in economic performance of 
fishers with private harvesting rights.  
  To address this problem, and improve the management 
of ITQ fisheries, the paper reviews different 
methodologies to assess the economic performance of 
fishers in terms of profitability, competitiveness, 
management quality and costs, efficiency, equity, 
productivity, output and input interactions, capacity and 
sustainability. A guide to these methodologies, and how 
they may be applied, should prove useful to researchers 
and fishery managers interested in improving the 
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1. One of the earliest reviews was by Muse and Schelle 
(1989).  Reviews of several different fisheries appeared in 
the edited volume entitled Rights Based Fishing by 
Neher, Arnason and Mollett (1989). 
2. One of the latest conferences was the November 1999 
conference on rights-based fishing in Fremantle, 
Australia. 
3. See, for example, Squires and Kirkley (1995) and 
Squires and Kirkley (1996). These papers address the 
issue of how to calculate an expected market equilibrium 
for quotas and the economic rents and gains in efficiency 
associated with trading using inverse derived demand 
functions. 
4. See Lindner et al. (1992). 
5. Such an approach was used by Herrmann (1996) when 
he assessed the output price increases which arose from 
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the introduction of  ITQs in the British Columbia halibut 
fishery. 
6. Anderson (1991) described the consequences of market 
power in an ITQ quota market. 
7. Evidence from at least one ITQ fishery, however, 
suggests that the introduction of ITQs into a fishery, if 
accompanied with a significant increase in the length of 
the fishing season, may increase the market power of 
harvesters at the expense of fish processors. See, for 
example, Love et al. (1995). 
8. For further details on concentration ratios, consult 
Scherer (1979). 
9. For a useful review of the different types of 
inefficiency, see Forsund et al. (1980). 
10.  A concise review of the methodology is provided by 
Lovell (1993). More detailed descriptions of DEA include 
Norman and Stoker (1991) and Coelli et al. (1998). 
11. Software to use the DEA methodology is available 
from several different sources. A DOS based program 
available free to academic researchers is DEAP can be 
sourced from Tim Coelli at tcoelli@metz.une.edu.au. A 
WINDOWS based program called OnFront is available 
from Shawna Grosskopf at Shawna.Grosskopf@orst.edu.   
12. If a cost frontier is specified then thH HUURU WHUP i 
must be added rather than subtracted from (3). 
13. See Schmidt (1985)  and Grafton et al. (1999) for 
further details. 
14.  Two econometric packages that can be used to 
directly estimate stochastic frontiers are FRONTIER 4.1, 
available from Tim Coelli at tcoelli@metz.une.edu.au, 
and LIMDEP authored by William Greene. 
15. See Grafton, Squires and Fox (1999) for an example 
and further details. 
16. The fact that the initial allocation of rights can affect 
the equilibrium outcome has it origins in Coase (1960). 
Grafton (1992) and Cunningham (1994) address this issue 
in fisheries and Weninger and Just (1997) develop a 
model that illustrates how fishers may delay their exit 
from a fishery under price uncertainty in the expectation 
of higher prices in the future. 
17. Grafton (1995) reviews the issues of rent capture in 
ITQ fisheries. 
18. For a nice discussion on these issues, see Ray (1998, 
chapter 6). 
19. Coelli et al. (chapter 4, 1998) provides a useful 
discussion on the different types of indices that can be 
used. 
20. See Coelli et al. (pp. 84-87, 1998) for details. 
21. Grosskopf  (1993) provides an excellent introduction 
to the measurement of productivity and efficiency. 
22. Squires (1992) in one of the first comprehensive 
papers on productivity in fisheries addresses the issue of 
the resource stock and productivity measurements. 
23. The output distance function is the reciprocol of the 
output-based measure of technical efficiency. Further 
details are provided in Fare et al. (1994). 
24. Two packages which are can be used are DEAP and 
OnFront (supra note 12 above).  
25. Squires et al. (1998) provide a useful review of the 
management issues of ITQ fisheries.  
26. A definitive reference on the estimation of  the theory 
and estimation of these functions is provided by 
McFadden (1978). 
27. Many different flexible functional forms can be 
estimated.  A review of some of these forms is provided 
by Fuss et al. (1978). 
28.  This function was first applied in fisheries by Kirkley 
and Strand (1988) and was used by  Squires and Kirkley 
(1991) to provide management insights about ITQ 
fisheries. Squires and Kirkley (1991) and  Squires and 
Kirkley (1996) provides a useful framework for 
improving the management of multi-species fisheries. 
29. Squires (1984) provides an excellent review of the 
hypotheses that can be tested from a restricted profit 
function estimated using fisheries data. 
30. For a definitive review and explanations and examples 
of how to apply the various approaches to measuring 
capacity in fisheries, consult Kirkley and Squires (1999).   
31. The approach was developed by F#re, Grosskopf and 
Kokkelenberg (1989). 
32. An application of the approach, applied to a multi-
product ITQ fishery, is provided in Dupont et al. (1999). 
33. The approach was developed in fisheries by Squires 
(1987) and Segerson and Squires (1990; 1993). 
34. Kirkley and Squires (1999) describe in detail these so-
called measures of excess capacity. 
35. Several authors have reviewed the potential problems 
associated with ITQs. One of the most widely cied 
critique of ITQs is Copes (1986).  
36. See Anderson (1994) and Arnason  (1994) for further 
details. 
37. For further details of the ICES Study Group see ICES 
(1997). 
                                                        
 
